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As agricultural trade continues to increase both volume and diversity, livestock sectors have 
become increasingly dependent on exports. The increasing importance of trade poses 
challenges to controlling contagious animal diseases. When a country is confronted with a 
transboundary disease like foot-and-mouth disease, the infection must be eradicated as soon 
as possible. A number of countries do this through large scale preventive culling, though 
vaccination-to-live strategies pose a compelling alternative. Compared to preventive culling, 
a vaccination-to-live strategy poses several differences, including the size and duration of the 
outbreak, total economic losses, loss distribution among different stakeholders, and 
consequences for financing mechanisms. But because vaccination-to-live strategies are 
relatively new in the European Union, markets may be slow to accept products originating 
from FMD-vaccinated animals. The objective of this paper is to evaluate different economic 
aspects of a vaccination-to-live strategy deployed to eradicate FMD in a country previously 
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The world has become a global marketplace in which agricultural trade continues to 
increase both in volume and diversity (Figure 1). This trend is also observed for livestock 
sectors, which have become increasingly dependent on exports. As Table 1 demonstrates, 
exports are important not only for countries with traditional export-oriented livestock 
industries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, but also for a country like Germany, which 
sees substantial imports as well as exports. The increasing importance of trade poses 
challenges to controlling contagious animal diseases. The introduction of diseases like foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) presents a constant threat for countries, and can affect their trade 
opportunities. Despite OIE and EU regulations to protect countries from the threat of 
contagious animal diseases, there is always a risk of introduction. The consequences of an 
FMD outbreak can be devastating for the livestock sector in an affected country and for its 
economy in general (Box 1 shows the cost of the last outbreak in the Netherlands).  
Figure 1. Export of agricultural products 
 
Source: WTO, international trade statistics (2012), USD current prices. 
Table 1. Export value pig meat (2006) in EUR million 
 Netherlands Denmark Germany 
Total 1767 3333 2458 
Intra-European Union 1543 2115 2200 
Extra European Union 224 1218 257 
Fraction extra European Union 13% 37% 10% 
Source: De Winter et al., LEI 2010. 
When a country is confronted with a transboundary disease like FMD, the infection must 
be eradicated as soon as possible. Both OIE and the European Union offer guidelines on 
eradication, but additional measures are often needed to contain the outbreak — especially in 
densely populated livestock areas. In a number of countries, these additional measures include 
large scale preventive culling of animals around infected premises. Large scale culling is 
believed to have had a devastating impact on society, animal welfare and the environment, 
and is associated with high economic losses.  
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Previous epidemics caused societal outcry and disturbance (Cohen et al., 2007). In several 
countries, this response bolstered arguments for adopting alternative strategies to control 
future epidemics. This, in turn, fuelled calls to reconsider non-vaccination policies, and to 
discuss alternative prevention and control strategies that would be supported by society at 
large. There were also calls for strategies that would minimise financial and environmental 
impacts.  
One alternative under consideration involved the implementation of a vaccination-to-live 
strategy. The implementation of a vaccination-to-live differs from culling, as well other 
strategies in which vaccination is used as a way to postpone culling until a later moment. 
Decision making in the control contagious animal diseases is a complex process, characterised 
by a mixture of epidemiological, economic and social-ethical value judgements. Different 
stakeholders will have different ideas about which strategy should prevail. Their views may 
represent the interests of the farming community, the processing industry, the animals, the 
consumer, or the general citizen. This may create a situation of conflicting interests, as 
economic motives may prevail in the views of some, while animal or human welfare motives 
may be more prominent in the views of others (Mourits et al., 2010).  
Compared to preventive culling, a vaccination-to-live strategy poses several differences, 
including the size and duration of the outbreak, total economic losses, loss distribution among 
different stakeholders, and consequences for financing mechanisms. Since vaccination-to-live 
strategies are relatively new in the European Union, markets may be slow to accept products 
originating from FMD-vaccinated animals. The objective of this paper is to evaluate different 
economic aspects of a vaccination-to-live strategy deployed to eradicate FMD in a country 
previously free of vaccination.  
Box 1. Costs of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the Netherlands 
Twenty-six infected herds were detected. All susceptible animals on approximately 1 800 farms 
were vaccinated. All farms were subsequently depopulated. In total, approximately 260 000 animals 
were culled. 
 Total for Dutch society: EUR 900 million or 0.3% GNP 
 Direct costs (e.g. enforcement costs, compensation of culled animals, screening): EUR 90 million 
 Indirect and export market losses: EUR 320 million 
 Other parts of the livestock chain: EUR 215 million 
 Tourism and recreation sector: EUR 275 million 
Source (CPB 2001 cited by Huirne et al., 2002) 
Economic aspects of an outbreak of FMD 
During an outbreak of a contagious disease like FMD, farmers, livestock sectors and 
governments are confronted with direct and indirect losses. When evaluating the costs of an 
epidemic, different components can be distinguished. 
Direct costs related to the control of the epidemic 
These include infrastructure costs to control the epidemic, the costs associated with 
culling and destroying of infected and contact animals, the costs associated with destruction 
of feed and eggs on detected farms, and compensation and vaccination costs. In EU member 
states, these costs are co-financed by the European Union (Council Decision 90/424/EEC). 
Consequential losses can occur during an outbreak, as well. These include the following. 
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Costs related to movement restrictions affecting the primary sector 
Farms culled during the epidemic are confronted with income losses; during the time, 
stocks are not fully repopulated and culled farms are not in production. Farms are also 
confronted with new start-up costs. Farms in a surveillance or movement restriction zone face 
indirect losses during the standstill period, mainly due to the fact that they are not able to 
freely move animals or livestock products. An epidemic affects the entire livestock sector, 
restricting national and international market access to animals of susceptible species and their 
products. Even after the outbreak has passed, it takes time to lift restrictions and return to pre-
epidemic market conditions. 
Ripple effects 
The effects from outbreaks are felt upstream and downstream along the livestock value 
chain, from breeding, feed production, input supply, slaughter and processing, to final sale 
and consumption. 
Spill-over effects 
During outbreaks, tourism and other services in a member state may be confronted with 
reduced incomes. Because typical agricultural production is becoming more important for the 
rural economy, these spill-over effects are likely to comprise a large part of total epidemic 
costs.  
A major drawback of consequential losses is the fact that they are difficult to determine, 
and can usually be estimated only after the outbreak has ended, once the situation has returned 
to “business as usual.” 
Recent research from the Netherlands as illustration 
A number of recent studies in the Netherlands have examined vaccination-to-live 
strategies (Backer et al., 2012a, Backer et al., 2012b, Backer 2009). Results from these studies 
indicate that the epidemiologic and economic outcomes of an FMD outbreak depend on both 
the control strategy chosen, as well as the farm density in the region where an outbreak 
occurs.  
In these studies [four alternative control strategies were evaluated. 
 the EU minimum strategy (EU-min); this strategy consists of culling of infected farms, 
tracking and tracing of risky contacts and establishment of inspection zones (3 km) and 
surveillance zones (10 km) (COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/85/EC). 
 a culling strategy (Cul1), which calls for the culling of all FMD-susceptible and infected 
animals within a radius of one kilometre around infected farms (in addition to the EU-
min strategy).  
The remaining two preventive vaccination strategies are identical to the Cull strategy, 
differing only with respect to the size of the vaccination radius. 
 Vac2 (radius of two kilometres); and  
 Vac5 (radius of five kilometres)  
The Cull strategy would be implemented during the first week of the outbreak, before the 
deployment of a vaccination strategy. (A maximum one-week delay was anticipated, taking 
into account the necessary preparation of a vaccination strategy.)  
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The effect of each identified strategies was determined for a typical Dutch, densely 
populated livestock region with more than four farms per kilometre.  The economic analysis 
was based on the results of a stochastic epidemiological FMD simulation model. It was 
developed to investigate the consequences of the aforementioned alternative control 
strategies, and is described in detail by Backer et al., (2012a and 2012b). A partial budget 
model was developed to evaluate the economic consequences of different control strategies 
(Dijkhuizen and Morris, 1997). Economic parameters were estimated based on previous 
outbreaks and were discounted to reflect current prices. Cost parameters were based on 
Meuwissen et al. (1999), Mangen et al. (2002), Huirne et al. (2002) and Meuwissen et al. 
(2003), among others. Products of vaccinated animals had to be processed separately from the 
products of non-vaccinated animals (logistic slaughtering), resulting in reduced market access 
— especially for non-EU countries. Logistic slaughtering and reduced market access pose 
substantial costs to the industry (Meuwissen et al., 2009). Due to volume and reduced market 
access, products derived from vaccinated animals will lose value. 
Results of the simulation studies 
Because Backer et al. (2009, 2012a and 2012b) comprehensively described 
epidemiological consequences in terms of probability distributions, only the descriptive 
statistics are presented, including the mean value as well as the fifth and 95th percentiles. The 
duration of an outbreak and the number of farms infected, culled, and vaccinated differ 
substantially across control strategies (Table 2). The epidemiological simulation outcomes 
showed that in a Densely Populated Livestock Area (Densely Populated Livestock Area in 
which the farm density is larger than two farms per km
2
), the EU-min strategy will too often 
result in a lengthy outbreak, and is therefore not likely to be a preferred option for involved 
stakeholders. As a result, it is excluded from further evaluation. In terms of economic 
consequences, the Vac2 strategy entails the lowest average loss in a Densely Populated 
Livestock Area (Table 3). However, under favourable circumstances with limited spread, Cull 
is the preferred strategy (see the fifth percentile); under adverse circumstances, the Vac5 
strategy is preferred (see the 95
th
 percentile). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of simulated epidemiological outcomes for different control strategies  
of epidemics that started in a Dutch Densely Populated Livestock Area region* 
Strategy 
Duration in days Number of detected farms 
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% 
EU-min 254 166 375 1 578 1 099 2 091 
Cul1  61 25 111 48 17 94 
Vac2 70 33 118 78 22 158 
Vac5 47 25 78 46 19 88 
 Number of pre-emptively culled farms Number of vaccinated farms 
 Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% 
EU-min 463 355 572 0 0 0 
Cul1  1 015 336 1814 0 0 0 
Vac2 199 92 333 2 340 676 4 075 
Vac5 188 84 321 3 963 1 831 6 629 
* 
Hobby farms excluded. 
6 – ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF FMD CONTROL STRATEGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE AND POLICY 
 
 
LIVESTOCK DISEASE POLICIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ECONOMIES © OECD 2013 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of simulated economic losses for different control strategies of epidemics  
that started in a Dutch Densely Populated Livestock Area region* 
Area  
strategy 
Total losses  
EUR million 
Mean 5% percentile 95% percentile 
Cul1 193 64 349 
Vac 2 163 61 284 
Vac 5 170 77 286 
* Export losses excluded. 
Export losses 
An epidemic restricts national and international market access for animals of susceptible 
species and their products. An FMD will result in trade restrictions that are largely related to 
the epidemic per se and do not depend on the specific characteristics of the chosen control 
strategy. Once exports resume, it can take considerable time to regain access to profitable 
markets. 
Export market losses were excluded from the calculations. Market access for live animals, 
meat, meat products, milk and milk products from infected countries is restricted for another 
three months without vaccination and for another six months with vaccination-to-live (OIE 
Terrestrial Code Article 8.5.8). The total effects of export losses are determined according to 
the size and duration of the outbreak, the control strategy applied, and especially the country 
or area affected.  
Distribution of costs and financing the consequences 
In addition to differences in total costs, there is a shift in cost components across different 
strategies, underscoring a variability that has implications for involved stakeholders 
(Figure 2). EU community measures call for the co-financing of veterinary emergency 
measures. Council Decision 90/424/EEC allows for co-financing 60% of the costs of 
compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter for FMD, and any related operational expenditure 
(Bergevoet et al., 2011). In addition, the remaining costs for specific components are shared 
between the government and livestock farmers through a compulsory public statutory 
compensation scheme (Van Asseldonk et al., 2006). Indirect losses — including those arising 
from lower values for vaccinated animals and their products — are not eligible for 
compensation. As a consequence, of the covered cost a larger amount of the losses are borne 
by farmers under a vaccination strategy (Figure 2).  
For an outbreak in a Densely Populated Livestock Area, non-eligible costs comprise 13% 
of total costs related to the Cul1 strategy; this share increases to 46% with a Vac5 strategy. A 
large part of the non-eligible costs have to be borne by a relatively small number of farmers 
whose animals were vaccinated. The farmers’ willingness to participate in a vaccination-to-
live strategy might be determined by compensation mechanisms put in place to cover losses. 
Different compensation schemes are currently under discussion in the Netherlands. As 
described above, there are different ways to organise a cost and responsibility sharing scheme. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the different costs that occur during an outbreak 
   
 
Financing mechanisms 
When compensating farmers for direct losses during an FMD outbreak, most EU member 
states finance compensation entirely from their national budgets. Only in a few member states 
— e.g. Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and the Netherlands — does the animal production 
sector contribute to the funding for compensation of direct losses. These public-private 
financing schemes have a compulsory fund structure under which all farmers pay a levy.  
Some EU member states have implemented a compensation scheme for all or part of the 
consequential losses, either by means of private funding (which is compulsory in Romania), 
public funding (as in Austria, Cyprus, Czech, Finland, France, Portugal and Sweden), or 
public-private participation (Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
Statutory compensation schemes finance protection against losses for livestock farmers. 
These schemes are financed either by state or state-controlled public funds mutual funds with 
levies, or by ad hoc payments. In situations without state-established systems, only private 
insurance can be purchased (Koontz et al., 2006).  Below, characteristics of public funds and 
insurance systems are briefly discussed. 
Public funds are generally compulsory and guarantee reliable protection for all farmers. 
They are characterized by the following: catastrophes and disaster protection is state-
guaranteed, and there are no financial capacity problems or needs for reinsurance protection. 
In general, only direct losses are compensated, and compensation is only available for farmers 
who culled their herds because of formal, state-advised acts. No compensation is paid to 
farms situated in restriction zones, and indirect losses remain uncovered. There is also limited 
input and lower incentives for loss prevention measures, and there is no possibility for an 
individual risk-adjusted contribution or claim settlement. 
Risk financing with a levy system is based on pooling within the sector over time. 
Payments to the fund can be organised through up-front payments (deposit), assessment 
payments after an epidemic, or both. These latter two systems have no annually fixed levies, 
and the government will finance the compensation payments in advance. But government 
input will be repaid over the following years. When an epidemic breaks out, the levy is 
therefore set according to the amount that the government paid in advance for the sector. It is 
important to note that the levy can (and in most cases will) vary across livestock species. 
In public-private co-financing, the amount financed by the private sector can be 
proportional or non-proportional. If risks are shared by means of a proportional (pro-rata) 
DPLA cul 1 DPLA vac 2 
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contract between the government and the private sector, the levy is specified as a fraction of 
the coverage. With non-proportional contracts, the national government indemnifies only 
claims that are in excess of a particular threshold. 
In some countries it is possible to insure consequential losses through private insurance as 
well as public-private compensation schemes. Private insurance offers compensation for both 
direct and indirect losses, as well as individual risk-designed contracts for farmers. Private 
coverage also includes protection against business interruption and loss of income. There are 
incentives for loss prevention, as well, since insurance protection is available only for farms 
that meet stringent sanitary standards under surveillance monitoring (e.g. by dairies or pig 
control units). Insurers have specialised staff for individual risk-adjusted premium and claim 
settlements. There are also mutual insurance companies that combine the advantages of both 
mutual funds and insurances. With insurances, however, there is freedom of contracting (not 
everybody has to participate), and there are no compulsory schemes.  
However, private insurance poses some major drawbacks. In most member states, private 
livestock insurance is not developed, and the insurance industry has shown very little interest. 
There are problems with disaster coverage, as well, since reinsurance is available on a limited 
basis, and there are relatively high premiums due to tax and administration costs. 
Financing the potential losses arising from devalued vaccinated animals is a challenge for 
livestock sectors and governments. Since the value loss is seen as a consequential loss, public-
private arrangements for compensation might be seen as unwanted government support. An 
insurance system, meanwhile, may be perceived as expensive, and its freedom of contracting 
might result in moral hazards that affect non-insured livestock owners.  
Conclusion 
Research indicates that vaccination-to-live is a viable alternative to large scale culling. 
Acceptance of vaccination-to-live increases when regulation related to vaccination-to-live is 
harmonised with either culling or vaccination-as-delayed-culling. Simulation outcomes reveal 
that in the event of an FMD outbreak in a Dutch Densely Populated Livestock Area, 
vaccination within a radius of two kilometres would be as effective as culling within a one 
kilometre radius, with substantially smaller economic and social effects.  
For SPLAs (Sparsely Populated Livestock Areas in which the farm density is less than 
two farms per km
2
) absolute differences across analysed control strategies — differences that 
raise epidemiological, economic and social-ethical issues — are of less concern. Economic 
evaluations of FMD management options are likely to result in different solutions for different 
countries (e.g. due to differences in livestock population density, trade patterns, or acceptance 
of products originating from vaccinated animals). The decision making process should be 
supported by epidemiological and economic models. Agreements on mechanisms to finance 
both direct and consequential losses should be made before an outbreak occurs.  
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